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The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
PETER HEDSTRO¨M
Linko¨ping University
We study the effects of actors’ audience-specific reputations on their levels of success
with different audiences in the same field. Extending recent work that has emphasized
the presence of multiple audiences with different concerns, we demonstrate that con-
sidering audience specificity leads to an improved understanding of reputation effects.
Using data on emerging artists in the field of contemporary art from 2001 to 2010, we
investigate the manner in which artists’ audience-specific reputations affect their sub-
sequent success with two distinct audiences: museums and galleries. Our findings suggest
that audience-specific reputations have systematically different effects with respect to
success with museums and galleries. Our findings also illuminate the extent to which
audience-specific reputations are relevant for emerging research on the contingent effects
of reputation. In particular, our findings support our predictions that audiences differ
from one another in terms of the extent to which other signals (specifically, status and
interaction with other audiences) enhance or reduce the value of audience-specific rep-
utations. Our study thus advances theory by providing empirical evidence for the value of
incorporating audience-specific reputations into the general study of reputation.
Researchers examining various contexts, ranging
from product and service markets (Diekmann, Jann,
Przepiorka, & Wehrli, 2014; Rindova, Williamson,
Petkova, & Sever, 2005) to corporate financing
(Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; D’Aveni, 1990), stock
markets (Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010), entre-
preneurial efforts (Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Shane &
Cable, 2002), and cultural industries (Delmestri,
Montanari, & Usai, 2005; Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2012),
have shown that reputation is a valuable intangible
asset that increases reputation holders’ success
(Raub & Weesie, 1990; Shapiro, 1983). Most of this
research has operated under the assumption that
actors have a single overall reputation and, fur-
thermore, that reputation holders interact with an
audience whose members have homogenous con-
cerns (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990;
Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997). However, recent re-
search has shown that the same set of actors can face
multiple audiences, and that these audiences vary in
their sources of concern and uncertainty (Cattani,
Ferriani, & Allison, 2014; Kim & Jensen, 2014;
Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). This development allows
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for the possibility that even when actors have built
a positive reputation, the return from such a reputa-
tionmay not be uniform andmay depend on the type
of audience with which they interact.
In response, scholars have recently started to study
the audience-specificity of reputation. For example,
Jensen, Kim, and Kim (2012) advocated a conceptu-
alization in which reputation is understood to be
attribute-specific (containing information about
a specific set of attributes) and audience-specific
(containing information that can be evaluated in
terms of the expectations of a focal audience). Al-
though this conceptualization provides a useful
ground to develop theories about the audience-
specificity of reputations, it remains underspecified,
as it does not provide a systematic view of how mul-
tiple audiences might differ in their responses and,
therefore, how a given reputation can yield differen-
tial effects depending on the nature of the audiences
with which reputation holders interact. This is what
we address in our study.
We start our theoretical development by explicitly
considering that an actor’s reputation with an audi-
ence will have weaker effects on the actor’s success
with other audiences whose concerns are different
from those of the focal audience.We then extend our
theory by considering the contingencies in the ef-
fects of audience-specific reputations. Specifically,
insofar as audiences vary in how much they are
attuned to different types of signals, the effect of
audience-specific reputations ondifferent audiences
will vary further in conjunction with these other
types of signals. Research on accountability provides
an important insight in this regard. Defined as “the
implicit and explicit expectation that one may be
called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions
to others” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999: 255), account-
ability increases alongside the extent to which an
audience depends on external actors for critical re-
sources, because the audience must establish the
legitimacy of its claims to these resources (Pfeffer,
1981; Tetlock, 1991). Insofar as it is easier to gain
approval when different types of signals are con-
gruent, this implies that a given audience will value
a particular reputation more when this reputation
has increased congruencewith other types of signals,
especially when the audience faces higher account-
ability to others. In contrast, such congruence be-
tween reputation and other types of signals should
not enhance the value of reputation as much for an
audience facing lower accountability to others.
Therefore, we advance our theoretical develop-
ment by considering the level of accountability each
audience faces and the congruence of a particular
reputation with two other types of signals that have
been widely examined in management research: an
actor’s status and an actor’s interaction with audi-
ences other than the focal audience. We argue that
the value of reputation will increase with actors’
high-status affiliations, and this will be especially
true for the actors’ success with audiences that face
high accountability. In contrast, actors’ frequent in-
teractions with other audiences will dampen the
reputation effect, especially concerning their success
withaudiences that facehigher accountability.This is
because frequent interactions with other audiences
suggest an actor’s lack of fit vis-a`-vis the criteria of the
focal audience, and this makes it difficult to fully re-
alize the value of an actor’s reputation, especially
when the focal audience is stronglyexpected to justify
its decision. Therefore, high-status affiliations and
interactionswithotheraudiences influence theextent
to which an audience-specific reputation contributes
to the success of an actor with a focal audience,
depending on the level of accountability that this
audience faces.
We use data on artists and their exhibitions in the
contemporary art field to test our hypotheses. In this
field, there are two primary audiences for an artist’s
work: museums and galleries. These two audiences
have different concerns in deciding whose work to
exhibit.Museums tend to bemore interested in artistic
quality, whereas galleries tend to focus more on com-
mercial viability. Both audiences face considerable
uncertainty about whom to exhibit; however, due to
their divergent interests, each audience is more sen-
sitive to the attributes related to their own concerns.
As a result, a particular artist might have a valuable
audience-specific reputation with one audience, but
not with another, because of their reputation for a par-
ticular attribute. A reputation for artistic quality
enables artists to secure exhibitions at museums
(Alexander, 1996;Greenfeld,1988),whilea reputation
for commercial viability enables artists to secure ex-
hibitions at galleries (Caves, 2003; Thompson, 2008).
Museums and galleries also differ with respect to
accountability to their stakeholders. Museums are
often funded by a wide range of stakeholders, each
with its own objectives (DiMaggio, 1982). Because
museum curators are expected to justify their choice
of works to exhibit to different sponsors, they face
high accountability and thus rely more on signals. In
comparison, gallery owners face low accountability
because they typically have stakeholders whose key
interests are similar to each other (i.e., increasing
profitability by selling the works of their artists to
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connoisseurs (Lindemann, 2013; Velthuis, 2005)).
Hence, the decisions of gallery owners are easier to
justify, even when there might be less consistency
between the different types of signals.
Based on an analysis of data on 58,014 artists and
their exhibitions at 7,293 galleries and5,131museums
between2001 and2010, our resultsmake a strong case
for the audience-specificity of reputation effects. By
demonstrating not only differential main effects but
also differential contingent effects of artists’ reputa-
tions with museums and galleries, our study makes
two important contributions. First, researchers should
pay close attention to the context in which reputation
is considered, as the same reputation can result in
substantially different outcomes depending on the
nature of the audiences with which actors interact.
Second, we expand recent attempts to examine the
interplay between reputation and other types of sig-
nals (Ertug & Castellucci, 2013; Jensen & Roy, 2008;
Stern, Dukerich, & Zajac, 2014) by showing that such
interplay is dependent on contextual constraints im-
posedby the level of accountability audiences face.As
we elaborate in our discussion section, these findings
have broad and important theoretical and practical
implications for research on reputation.
THEORY
Audience-specific Reputations
A variety of studies inmanagement (e.g., Kilduff &
Krackhardt, 1994; Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011; Rao,
1994; Roberts & Dowling, 2002), economics (e.g.,
Banerjee & Duflo, 2000; Shapiro, 1983), and sociol-
ogy (e.g., Raub & Weesie, 1990) have provided evi-
dence that good reputations are valuable to actors,
whether these actors are individuals or organizations
(for an overview, see Rindova & Martins, 2012).
Scholars in management have defined reputation in
anumber ofways (Fombrun, 2012;Rindova&Martins,
2012) that are associated with different approaches to
measuring reputation (Dowling & Gardberg, 2012;
Lange, Lee,&Dai, 2011).Acommonlyheldview is that
reputation involves being “known” for something
(Jensen&Roy, 2008; Lange et al., 2011) and is based on
an actor’s accomplishments and history (Barron &
Rolfe, 2012; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988).1
Previous studies that have examined the external
signals of reputation (Anand&Peterson, 2000; Carter
et al., 1998; Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2012; Philippe &
Durand, 2011) have suggested that reputation re-
duces uncertainty about an actor’s future behavior,
which enables evaluators (i.e., an audience) to assess
actors (Spence, 1973). A positive reputation is ben-
eficial because it reduces uncertainty and provides
reassurance of an actor’s value. For example, be-
cause CEO quality is uncertain, executives’ reputa-
tions provide information to stakeholders (Graffin,
Pfarrer, & Hill, 2012) that is relevant for predicting
executives’ future behavior (e.g., Milbourn, 2003). In
turn, these signals benefit CEOs and allow thosewith
positive signals to claim increased compensation for
their performance (e.g., Wade, Porac, Pollock, &
Graffin, 2006).
A crucial assumption underlyingmost research on
reputation is that, even with a multiplicity of repu-
tation signals, reputation is a single actor-level con-
struct and that the users of reputation (i.e., audiences
for the actors’ behavior or products) exhibit homog-
enous sources of concern and uncertainty. However,
recent developments in research on categories have
suggested that a given set of actors routinely interact
with multiple audiences. This has an important im-
plication regarding the value of reputation for actors’
success in the presence of uncertainty, because
while each of these audiences represents “collec-
tions of agents with an interest in a domain and
control over material and symbolic resources that
affect the success and failure of the claimants in the
categorical domain” (Hsu & Hannan, 2005: 476),
their primary sources of concern and uncertainty are
different from one another. For example, due to their
concern for preserving the norms and exclusiveness
of film actors, the peer audience in the Hollywood
motion-picture industry focuses on attributes such
as actors’networkposition; in contrast, the film critic
audience focuses on attributes such as film novelty
and creativity, and is not interested in actors’ net-
work positions (Cattani et al., 2014). Similarly,
Pontikes (2012) found that software companies with
ambiguous organizational forms were discounted
among the consumer audience that evaluated these
companies because this audience valued clarity. By
contrast, these companies were highly valued by the
venture capital audience, who regarded the ambi-
guity in organizational form as potentially indicating
novelty that might predict innovative performance.
Thus, these studies reveal the presence of multiple
audiences with varying sources of concerns, and,
more important, suggest that these distinct concerns
1 Although we are studying reputation at the individual
level (i.e., the reputations of artists in the field of contem-
porary art), our framework is nonetheless also based on
relevant arguments, findings, and contributions from re-
search on reputation at the organizational level.
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can lead to different evaluations of the same actors.
This further implies that the value of reputation is
dependent on the focal audience with which actors
engage.
Audience-specific Reputations in the
Contemporary Art Field
Reputations are important in many contexts, and
this is especially true in themarket for contemporary
art, which has long been characterized by high un-
certainty (e.g., Caves, 2000; Khaire & Wadhwani,
2010). Art goods are complex and difficult to com-
pare, and there are no precise methods available for
making aesthetic and financial judgments (Yogev,
2010). Aswith other culturalmarkets, it is difficult to
identify differences in quality among products, to
assess them objectively, and to predict the artists or
products that will achieve success (DiMaggio, 1977;
Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006). Reputation thus
plays a key role in art fields in general, (Lang & Lang,
1988, 1990) and in the contemporary art field in
particular, by providing audiences with information
that reduces uncertainty regarding the criteria that
are relevant to them.
In the contemporary art field, there are two pri-
mary audiences for an artist’s work: museums and
galleries. Both museums and galleries play signifi-
cant roles in artists’ careers and serve as crucial
gatekeepers. However, there are important differ-
ences regarding how museums and galleries evalu-
ate artists and their artworks.Museums servemainly
as public art collectors and are funded by various
types of stakeholders, including professional orga-
nizations, foundations, governments, and individual
philanthropists. As representatives of these stake-
holders, museums act as gatekeepers with respect
to artistic quality, but do not necessarily assess
the artist’s work from the perspective of profit
(Alexander, 1996; Greenfeld, 1988). Museums con-
sider themselves an alternative to the commercial art
world and differentiate themselves from the com-
mercial sphere. Because the role and duty of mu-
seums is topreserve, expand, andpresent collections
(Boll, 2011), they search for artists who are likely to
have high-quality artwork (Lindemann, 2013). In
contrast, galleries are private institutions, and their
owners represent and sell artists’ work, often to
a small pool of individual connoisseurs, while
seeking to maximize sales commissions from in-
vestment in artists (Lindemann, 2013; Velthuis,
2005). Galleries are thus more interested in artists
whose work has commercial viability (Caves, 2003;
Thompson, 2008). Both audiences face considerable
uncertainty regarding the selection of artists to ex-
hibit. However, each audience is primarily sensitive
to the uncertainty associated with the attributes that
involve their specific needs and concerns.
We argue that a reputation that represents a spe-
cific set of attributes ismore valuable to one audience
than to another. In particular, a reputation that in-
dicates that an artist’s work is of high artistic quality
will help that artist to procure exhibitions at mu-
seums more than it will help the artist to secure ex-
hibitions at galleries. By contrast, a reputation that
indicates the commercial viability of an artist’s work
will help the artist to secure exhibitions at galleries
more than it will help them to obtain exhibitions at
museums. Our claim is not that museums entirely
disregard commercial viability; instead, we posit
that artistic quality is the primary concern and
source of uncertainty for museums in responding to
stakeholders and in affecting their standing in the
field and, as a consequence, that artistic quality is
more important to museums than to galleries. Be-
cause museums and galleries have different con-
cerns and interests, the value of each type of
reputation for bringing success to an artist will differ
with each audience. The concerns and sources of
uncertainty for museums indicate that a reputation
for artistic quality is more likely to bring an artist
success with museums than with galleries. In con-
trast, an artist with a reputation for commercial via-
bility is more likely to achieve success with galleries
than with museums. Therefore, we hypothesize as
follows:
Hypothesis 1a. An artist’s reputation for artistic
quality will have a stronger relationship with
this artist’s success with museums than with
galleries.
Hypothesis 1b. An artist’s reputation for com-
mercial viability will have a stronger relation-
ship with this artist’s success with galleries than
with museums.
Taking audience-specific reputations into account
not only leads to predictions regarding the differen-
tial effects of each type of reputation, but also con-
tributes novel insights to research on the contingency
of reputation effects. Several researchers have noted
thatpositive reputationsarenotuniversallybeneficial
(Lee et al., 2011; Oldroyd & Morris, 2012; Rhee &
Haunschild, 2006; Wade et al., 2006). This approach
highlights the relevance and value of studying factors
that moderate reputation effects, particularly when
116 FebruaryAcademy of Management Journal
different types of signals for evaluating an actor are
available (e.g., Pollock & Gulati, 2007). Studies
have increasingly sought to understand the relation-
ship between actors’ reputations and status (e.g.,
Chandler, Haunschild, Rhee, & Beckman, 2013; Ertug
& Castellucci, 2013; Jensen & Roy, 2008; Pollock, Lee,
Jin, & Lashley, 2015; Sorenson, 2014; Stern et al.,
2014). The emerging consensus in this research is that
although both reputation and status signal un-
observed qualities, they differ because reputation is
based on prior accomplishments and behavior,
whereas status is based on an actor’s position in a so-
cial hierarchy that both reflects and influences how
the actor is acknowledged by others (Sauder, Lynn, &
Podolny, 2012).
At first glance, reputation and status seem to have
a complementary relationship, in which the value of
reputation is enhanced by status. As distinct sources
of information about an actor’s unobserved qualities,
the joint consideration of reputation and status en-
ables an evaluator to confirm the information each
conveys. Therefore, these two signals reinforce one
another when they provide consistent information—
for example, enjoying a good reputation and high
status or having abad reputation and lowstatus (Stern
et al., 2014).However, researchhas suggested that this
complementary relationship might not always hold.
For example, Jensen and Roy (2008) proposed a se-
quential model in which audiences initially con-
sidered actors’ status and then considered their
reputations within that status position. In their study
of the National Basketball Association, Ertug and
Castellucci (2013) claimed that reputation and status
are related to different outcomes. They found that
players with reputations improved on-court team
performance,while playerswithhigh status increased
their teams’ ticket revenue (see also Washington &
Zajac, 2005 for another view regarding the in-
dependent effects of status and reputation). Although
these studies agree that both reputation and status re-
duce uncertainty regarding an actor’s unobserved
qualities, the interplay between reputation and status
in determining outcomes is far from unequivocal.
The differences in the proposed relationships be-
tween reputation and status could be partly due to
the fact that most of this research has not considered
contextual constraints. This is a significant short-
coming because contextual factors can constrain
a decisionmaker’s evaluation of both reputation and
status. An important and widely established factor
constraining decision makers’ evaluations is their
accountability to others (see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999;
Tetlock, 1991 for a review). Accountability to others,
which refers to the expectation to justify one’s de-
cision to others (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), is an im-
portant factor that affects how decision makers
interpret and incorporate information frommultiple
signals into their evaluations. For example, Jensen
(2006) found that a firmwithhigh accountabilitywas
more likely to discard an auditor with a recently ac-
quired negative reputation because it would be dif-
ficult to justify retaining an auditor whose integrity
was in dispute (see also Jensen & Roy, 2008).
Evaluators with high accountability are more
likely tomake decisions that aremore easily justified
(Tetlock, 1991). One implication of this claim is that
an audience (e.g., museums or galleries) with higher
accountability ismore sensitive to inconsistencies in
different types of signals than an audience with
lower accountability, because decisions based on
consistent signals are easier to justify. Accordingly,
the effect of an actor’s reputation on their success
with an audience will increase based on their status,
and this reinforcing effect will be stronger for audi-
ences with higher accountability to others.
An audience exhibits high accountability when it
depends on others for critical resources, such as fi-
nancial resources, because the audiencemust address
various concerns to legitimately claim resources
(Pfeffer, 1981). More specifically, we assume that an
audience will exhibit higher accountability to others
when it needs to gain resources froma greater number
of stakeholders whose objectives differ from one an-
other. In this regard, museums and galleries in the
contemporary art field face different levels of ac-
countability. Because museums are typically funded
by sponsors such as corporations, philanthropists,
governments, foundations, and professional associa-
tions (Alexander, 1996), museum curators must ad-
dress the requests and expectations of a diverse set of
funders (e.g., Perry, 2014; Robertson, 2006). For ex-
ample, Turner Prize-winning artist Grayson Perry
referred to the1984 incident inwhich theTateGallery
(a high-status museum) exhibited works by Hans
Haacke that expressed views criticizing Mobil Oil’s
policies.Thisexhibitioncreatedproblems for theTate
because Mobil Oil was one of the Tate’s sponsors at
the time (Perry, 2014). Recent news stories inEngland
regarding the relationship between funders (specifi-
cally,BP) andhowthese relationshipsmight affect the
Tate’s freedom and policies also indicate that these
types of concerns remain relevant for museums
(e.g., Brown, 2015b, 2015a).
Conversely, galleries are typically privately owned
or supported by only a handful of sponsors who
share similar primary interests concerning increased
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profitability (Caves, 2003).As a consequence, gallery
owners can more easily justify their decisions to
exhibit a particular artist’s works. In doing so, they
are focused on selling the artworks of the artists they
exhibit to collectors and connoisseurs, notwith-
standing the controversies the artworks or the artists
might invoke. For instance, Lisson Galleries contin-
ued their exhibition of Santiago Sierra’s work for
well over a decade, despite the refusal of some of
their prospective customers to buy anything from the
gallery following the exhibition of offensive or con-
troversial work by Sierra (Jeffries, 2002; see also
Lisson Gallery at http://www.lissongallery.com/
artists/santiago-sierra, accessed on March 9, 2015).
It should also be noted that in this instance the gal-
lery owner explicitly defended the work and stated
that he sympathized with the concepts underlying it
(Rosier, 2011). More generally, as a younger gallery
owner has stated: “galleries can do what the public
sector can’t; they are not constrained by account-
ability” (Duguid, 2007). Hence, gallery owners are
less concerned about the consistency of different
types of signals than museum curators are.
Given the different levels of accountability that
members of the museum and gallery audiences face
with respect to deciding whose works to exhibit, the
contingent effect of audience-specific reputations,
which is based on the actor’s status, should be
greater for the audience facing higher accountability
(i.e., museums). In particular, the increased benefit
to anartist’s audience-specific reputation that results
from a high-status signal should positively affect the
artist’s successwithmuseumsmore than it doeswith
galleries. Because museum curators are expected to
justify their decisions to a greater number of stake-
holders, they are more likely to exhibit the work of
high-status artists who also have a reputation for ar-
tistic quality, compared with artists who have a rep-
utation for artistic quality but without high status. In
comparison, because gallery owners face lower ac-
countability and less need to address the preferences
and expectations of stakeholders (who are primarily
the owners themselves or a small number of key
supporters), their decisions are less influenced by
the consistency between audience-specific repu-
tation and status. Therefore, the effects of actors’
audience-specific reputations, as contingent on their
status (in which a high audience-specific reputation
will be more effective when accompanied by high
status) should have a greater impact on success with
museums than on success with galleries. In other
words, the relationship between an artist’s reputa-
tion for artistic quality and their success with
museums will be enhanced to a greater degree if this
artist also has high status, as compared to the in-
creased strength of the relationship between an art-
ist’s reputation for commercial viability and their
successwith galleries if the artist also has high status.
Hypothesis 2. The (positive) contingent effect of
an actor’s audience-specific reputation, where
this contingency is based on their status, will be
stronger for success with museums than for
success with galleries.
Another important source of information that an
audience might use to assess an actor’s unobserved
qualities is the actor’s interaction with other audi-
ences. A particular actor might differ in the extent to
which they engage with different audiences in the
same field. For example, Pontikes (2012) examined
software companies and found that the same com-
pany might be more active with a venture capital
audience and less active with a consumer audience.
Therefore, a particular actor might be more or less
active with different audiences in the same field. For
example, musicians might release albums in certain
genres rather than in others, film actorsmight appear
in some but not all film genres, writers might pro-
duce genre fiction or literary fiction, and artists
might differ in the extent to which they exhibit at
museums and galleries.
Accordingly, we propose that the extent to which
an actor interacts with other audiences provides
a source of information to a focal audience beyond
the actor’s audience-specific reputation. Some studies
have directly examined the implications of inter-
audience information spillover (e.g., Pollock, Rindova,
& Maggitti, 2008). For example, actors who are well
established with one audience may leverage their in-
tangible assets to obtain advantages with another audi-
ence (Jensen, 2003). In these studies, the interaction
with another audience is considered a positive signal
because such information signals the unobserved
quality of an actor, especially when the sources of
concern and uncertainty for different audiences are
similar to each other, as is the case in financialmarkets.
This may not be always the case, however, espe-
cially when the sources of concern and uncertainty
of different audiences diverge or are even in-
compatible. In our context, artistic quality, which is
a concern for museums, and commercial viability,
which is a main focus of galleries, can diverge. In
such cases, the emerging literature on typecasting
suggests that interaction with a different audience
might, in fact, signal a lack of fit between an actor and
a focal audience’s interests and concerns (Faulkner,
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1983; Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & Rittmann, 2003).
These findings suggest that a positive reputation
with a focal audience (i.e., an audience-specific
reputation) and greater interactions with another
audience with different concerns yield inconsistent
information. Therefore, greater interaction with an-
other audiencemight reduce the value of reputation,
insofar as the resulting inconsistency weakens the
extent to which reputation reduces uncertainty for
the focal audience.
While incompatible sources of concern and un-
certaintywould beproblematic for anymember of an
audience, not all memberswould be equally affected
because theymight vary in their constraints regarding
their adherence to core values (Phillips, Turco, &
Zuckerman, 2013). Accordingly, we argue that this
will be particularly true for high-statusmembers of an
audience, as they are expected to exemplify and
champion the audience’s core values (see Hogg, 2010
for a review). High-status audience members attract
a disproportionate level of attention, and their de-
cisions and behaviors are closely followed by others
seeking to reduce the uncertainty the latter face in
their decisions (Hogg, 2010). For example, when
a high-status analyst stops covering a particular stock,
other analysts are more likely to abandon their cov-
erage of the same stock (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001).
Similarly, software developers’ efforts aremore likely
to follow the directions initiated by high-status de-
velopers (Simcoe &Waguespack, 2011).
Although high-status members of an audience
might experiment and deviate from previous and
established courses of action (Phillips & Zuckerman,
2001), the disproportionate attention and close ob-
servation they receive are problematic when their
decisions and behaviors do not align with the core
norms and expectations of other members of the same
audience (Phillips et al., 2013). Consistent with this
idea, high-status audience members are likely to re-
ceive disproportionate censure for controversial de-
cisions and behaviors (Graffin, Bundy, Porac,Wade, &
Quinn, 2013). This issue is illustrated in our research
setting by recent news stories regarding the funding
that the Tate Gallery receives from BP and events that
have created controversy, despite the relatively small
amount of funding provided by the BP sponsorship
(only 0.5% of the Tate’s overall income). Because the
Tate is a high-statusmember of themuseumaudience,
its behavior and decisions are expected to exemplify
the core values of this audience—in this instance, fo-
cusing on art and artistic quality, rather than on the
concerns of oil industry sponsors (Brown, 2015b,
2015a). Therefore, an actor’s lack of fit with a focal
audience due to the actor’s greater interaction with
other audiences is particularly problematic for high-
status audiencemembers.Asaconsequence, the effect
of an actor’s audience-specific reputation is dis-
counted in the evaluations and decisions of high-
status audience members regarding this actor.
Here again, however, the level of accountability an
audience faces influences the extent to which the
value of reputation is discounted. An evaluation
discount based on inconsistent information from
cross-audience interactions is more important to
members of an audience facing high accountability,
as they need to justify their decisions to others given
the information provided by different types of sig-
nals. Therefore, the extent to which high-status
audience members discount an actor’s audience-
specific reputation is greater for an audience with
higher accountability than for an audience with
lower accountability. Therefore, we expect the rep-
utation discount due to greater interaction with an-
other audience to be greater for an artist exhibiting at
high-status museums than for an artist exhibiting at
high-status galleries.
Hypothesis 3. The extent to which high-status
museums discount an artist’s reputation due to
the artist’s interaction with gallery audiences is
greater than the extent to which high-status
galleries discount an artist’s reputation due to
the artist’s interaction with museum audiences.
DATA AND METHODS
Because the contemporary art market is charac-
terized by a high degree of uncertainty (Caves, 2000;
Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010), reputation plays an im-
portant role byhelping stakeholders to copewith this
uncertainty (Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012). As
Fombrun (2012: 98) noted, “the greater the ambiguity
experienced by constituents, the greater the impor-
tance of reputation as it reduces uncertainty.”Due to
the absence of tangible and agreed-upon parameters
for quality assessment, an artist’s reputation serves
as a useful signal to those whomight be interested in
the artist’s work.
In our study, data regarding exhibitions were ob-
tained from ArtFacts.Net, which covers exhibitions
at museums and galleries worldwide.2 The artist-
year panel data consisted of 311,839 observations
2 The gallery exhibition data from the raw database
provided by ArtFacts.Net was also used by the first two
authors in Yogev and Ertug (2015).
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comprising data on 58,014 newly emerging artists
between 2001 and 2010. We define newly emerging
artists as those who had not exhibited at any gallery
or museum in our database prior to 2001 and who
had at least one exhibition at a gallery or museum in
our database between 2001 and 2010. Between 2001
and 2010, these artists exhibited at 5,131 museums
and 7,293 galleries. Based on these exhibition re-
cords, we construct two separate artist-year panels,
one for museum exhibitions and one for gallery ex-
hibitions. Once an artist had one exhibition at either
amuseumor gallery, the artist was followeduntil the
end of the observation period (i.e., 2010) in each
panel. Thepopulation of artistswas thus the same for
both the museum exhibitions panel and the gallery
exhibitions panel. These twopanels formed the basis
for the empirical models used in our analysis, which
is explained in greater detail below.
Dependent Variables
To capture an artist’s success, we construct two in-
dicator variables that measure whether the artist had
an exhibition at a museum or at a gallery in a given
year. In the art field, the ability to exhibitwork at either
museums or galleries is an accepted indicator of an
artist’s success with that audience (Yogev, 2010).
There are many artists and relatively few exhibition
spaces, which creates competition among artists. The
oversupply of artists (Menger, 1999; Thompson, 2008;
White &White, 1965) results in a continuous filtering
process by gallery owners and museum curators.
Particularly for emerging artists, obtaining an exhibi-
tion at either a gallery or a museum is essential for an
artist’s career in the artmarket. As a result, we use two
variables,Gallery Exhibition andMuseumExhibition,
to capture an artist’s success within each audience in
a particular year, assigning a value of 1 if the artist had
at least one exhibition in the current year with that
audience and 0 otherwise.3
Independent Variables
Audience-specific reputations. We measure two
different reputation signals to capture an artist’s
different attributes. First, previous research has
suggested that winning an award acts as certification
for an actor’s reputation (Rindova et al., 2005; Wade
et al., 2006), which validates achievements that are
not recognized in other ways. In the field of con-
temporary art, awards are given based on perceived
artistic quality rather than on commercial viability.
For example, Street (2005: 838) noted, “prizes have
to distinguish themselves from commercial success
indefining ‘quality’ and establishing their credibility
as judges of it.”Therefore, to construct ameasure that
captures a reputation for artistic quality, we selected
18 awards that are considered the most prestigious
based on our consultation with experts in the field,
including artists, critics, curators, and gallery owners.
These awards are conferred on the basis of perceived
artistic quality,4 and we coded the winners of these
awards over the 13-year period from 1998 until 2010.
The variableAwardWon takes a value of 1 beginning
from the year that the artist won any of the 18 awards
we track until the end of our study period, and
0 otherwise.
Second, an artist’s appearance in prominent mag-
azines serves as a signal of the commercial viability
of their work (Caves, 2000; Velthuis, 2005). Media
exposure, which is primarily associated with the
commercial value of an artist’s work, provides one
source of an actor’s reputation (Carroll & McCombs,
2003; Deephouse, 2000). In the contemporary art
field, Thornton (2008) noted that the appearance of
an artist on the front cover of a magazine is critical,
and Plattner (1998) stated that one indicator of the
commercial viability of an artist’s work is appearing
on the cover of magazines. To create our reputation
measure, which acts as a certification of commercial
viability, we selected 10 prominent magazines cov-
ering the field of contemporary art, and we use an
indicator variable, Magazine Cover, which takes
a value of 1 beginning with the first year that an art-
ist’s name or artwork appeared on the cover of any
issue of our 10magazines and continuing until 2010,
and 0 otherwise.5 We lag these reputation signal
3 An exhibition is assigned to the year inwhich it begins.
4 Our list includes the following awards: Baloise Prize,
Beck’s Futures, BP Portrait Award, Bucksbaum Award, Co-
logne FineArt Award, the Dorothea von StettenArt Award,.
EMDash Award, Hugo Boss Prize, John Moores Painting
Prize, Marcel Duchamp Prize, Ordway Prize, Praemium
Imperiale, Prix Pictet, Ricard Foundation Prize, Rolf Schock
Prize, the Vincent van Gogh Biennial Award for Contem-
porary Art, and theWolf Foundation Prize in Art
5 Similar to the awards list, this list was created in con-
sultationwith experts in the field, including artists, critics,
curators, and gallery owners, and included the following
magazines: ArtAsiaPacific, ARTFORUM, Art in America,
Art Monthly, Artnews, Art Review, Flash Art, Frieze,
Modern Painters, and Parkett. We inspected andmanually
coded the names of artists orworks by artists that appeared
on the cover for each issue of these magazines for the 13-
year period between 1998 and 2010.
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indicators by one year before entering them into our
estimation models.
Moderator variables. To capture an artist’s status
withmuseumor gallery audiences, we use an artist’s
exhibitions at high-status museums or galleries,
which is an affiliation-based measure of status, as is
commonly conceptualized in the literature (Podolny,
1993). To identify high-status museums, we use the
annual exhibition attendance figures published by
The Art Newspaper. We identified the 100 museums
with themost visitors in2010ashigh-statusmuseums;
these high-status museums constitute 1.9% of the
museums in our sample. To identify high-status gal-
leries, we use the ranking assigned to galleries by
ArtFacts.Net, the art market consulting firm that pro-
vided our database.6 We use the 2010 rankings be-
cause the perceived rankings of either galleries or
museums do not change rapidly, and the consulting
firmprovideduswith proprietary gallery ranking data
for 2010 only. As a result, the 100 galleries with the
highest rankings for the study period comprise our set
of high-status galleries; these galleries constitute 1.4%
of those in the database. Based on our lists of high-
status museums and galleries, we created two vari-
ablesmeasuring thecumulativenumberof exhibitions
an artist had in these museums (Prior Exhibitions at
High-Status Museums) or galleries (Prior Exhibitions
at High-Status Galleries). We also created two addi-
tional variables measuring the cumulative frequency
of an artist’s exhibitions at other, non-high-status,
museums (Prior Exhibitions at Other Museums) or
galleries (Prior Exhibitions at Other Galleries).
To assess the extent to which an artist interacted
with other audiences, we measure the cumulative
frequency of the artist’s exhibitions with the other,
non-focal audience. We thus created two variables.
For models predicting an artist’s success with a mu-
seum audience, Prior Exhibitions at Galleries serves
as the variablemeasuring the frequency of the artist’s
exhibitions at galleries. For models predicting an
artist’s success with a gallery audience, Prior Exhi-
bitions at Museums serves as the variable measuring
the frequency of the artist’s exhibitions at museums.
A log transformation was used to adjust for the
skewed distributions of these variables, which were
also lagged byone year (we added one to these values
before taking the log transformation, to avoid gener-
ating missing values in the case of zeros). To test
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, the moderator vari-
ables were mean-centered before they were inter-
acted with Award Won orMagazine Cover.
Control variables. The success of an artist might
be influenced by tenure in the art field, which might
increase the artist’s experience in securing exhibi-
tions, enhance the legitimacy of their work, and in-
crease or decrease the likelihood that the artist was
involved in a popular art trend. To control for the po-
tential effects of tenure, we include the Artist Tenure
variable, which measures the (log-transformed) num-
ber of years since the artist’s first exhibition at either
a gallery or a museum. Although an artist may have
been engaged in artmaking for an extended period
prior to the first exhibition, we use the first exhibition
to start the tenure clock because the first exhibition
plays a critical role in, and is typically considered the
beginning of, an artist’s professional career (Frey &
Pommerehne, 1989). We also control for Country
Diversity–Museums using a log transformation of the
cumulative number of different countries inwhich the
artist has had museum exhibitions, and Country
Diversity–Galleries as a log transformation of the cu-
mulative number of different countries in which the
artist has had gallery exhibitions. These variables also
partially account for time-varying differences across
actors because the range of countries inwhich an artist
has exhibited their works can serve as an indicator of
the appeal of their work. Finally, we include a set of
year indicator variables to control for year-specific
effects.
Estimation
Analternative explanation for reputation effects in
explaining artists’ success is the difference in talent
across artists. Insofar as artists differ in their talent,
the effect of reputation may be a by-product of such
heterogeneity (i.e., highly talented artists would ob-
tain positive reputation signals and be more suc-
cessful as a result). The heterogeneity in talent across
artists is mostly unobserved, thereby making it dif-
ficult to identify the unbiased effect of reputation. To
account for such unobserved heterogeneity, we use
a logit model with fixed effects. More formally,
pr

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where yit denotes the binary random variable, xit is
a vector of covariates, b is the vector of parameters of
interest, and ai is a series of indicators that model
6 There are no available objective data to assess top gal-
leries over time. However, we showed our list of top gal-
leries to a number of actors in the art field—such as artists,
critics, and curators—and they agreed that the list gives
a reliable picture of the top galleries for the decade we
study.
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time-invariant individual-specific effects. Nonethe-
less, the naı¨ve use of indicators to estimate ai in non-
linear models, such as logit models, introduces
a potential bias, particularly when panel time, t
(i.e., years), is fixed with an increasing number of
individuals, i (i.e., artists), which is known as the
incidental parameters problem (Greene, 2012).7
Econometricians and management researchers rec-
ommend that in these cases the conditional likeli-
hood, rather than the unconditional likelihood,
should be estimated (Chamberlain, 1980; Greene,
2004; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Following these
recommendations,we estimate a likelihood function
that is conditioned on the sum of prior successes,
Lc5Pni5 1pr

yij +
Ti
t51
yit

where Lc refers to the conditional likelihood and yi
is a vector that contains the sequence of discrete
random variables for artist i over his or her career, Ti
(e.g., Greene, 2012). By conditioning the likelihood
function on the different combinations of past suc-
cess, the individual-specific time-invariant hetero-
geneity, ai, is factored out of the likelihood function,
thereby allowing us to control for artist fixed effects
and avoid the incidental parameters problem. How-
ever, because artists with only one year of observa-
tion (i.e., artists beginning their careers in 2010) and
artists who never had an exhibition or had an exhi-
bition in every year of their career do not contribute
to the conditional likelihood function, they are drop-
ped from the estimation. This reduces the number of
artists included in the estimation and accounts for
differences in the estimation sample sizes for the dif-
ferent dependent variables. Nevertheless, conditional
logit estimates that factor out time-invariant charac-
teristics of artists, such as gender, ethnicity, national-
ity, and the innate talent or proclivity to developwork
that has artistic or commercial viability, would yield
unbiased estimates of the effect of audience-specific
reputations on different audiences. Given the sub-
stantial heterogeneity due to individual differences,
conditional logit estimates allow us to conservatively
test our hypotheses. Finally, because observations in
the longitudinal panel design are not independent, we
cluster standard errors on artists to adjust for possible
non-independence across same-actor observations.
Once we estimate the conditional logit models,
we formally test our hypotheses by comparing the
effects of our key independent variables between
two models, one for predicting the likelihood of
having an exhibition at museums and the other for
predicting the likelihood of having an exhibition at
galleries. However, formally testing our hypotheses
is not straightforward because this requires cross-
model comparisons of the estimated effects from non-
linear models.8 Furthermore, because our two panels
(the museums panel and the galleries panel) contain
thesamepoolof artists,unobservedcharacteristics (the
analogs of “error terms” in linear estimations)might be
correlatedacross the twomodels and influence the (co)
variance estimates. To address this issue, we used
seemingly unrelated estimations, which simulta-
neously estimate (co)variances and allow cross-model
comparisons of the coefficient estimates even in non-
linear models. We used the SUEST command in Stata
13 to obtain these corrected (co)variances. With the
corrected (co)variances, we perform the Wald test to
formally test our hypotheses.
RESULTS
Tables 1A and 1B present the untransformed
means and standard deviations, in addition to bi-
variate correlations for the variables based on the
estimation sample predicting museum exhibitions
(Table 1A) or gallery exhibitions (Table 1B) in a given
year. Table 2A presents the results of predicting the
likelihood of having an exhibition at museums in
a given year, while Table 2B presents the results for
7 In addition, itwas impractical to naı¨vely estimate fixed
effects for each artist because of the extensive number of
them in our sample, although the conditional likelihood
estimation we implement is preferable in any case.
8 Prior literature has suggested that when comparing
coefficients between two non-linear models, there might
be a potential problem, termed “innocent normalization”
(Greene, 2012), because the coefficients are normalized by
different factors across two models. Although researchers
have suggested heterogeneous choice models to address
this issue (Williams, 2010), these alternative models are
also prone to biases, as they rely on researchers’ decision
(which is generally arbitrary) to estimate the normalizing
factors. Insteadof relying onheterogeneous choicemodels,
we use conditional logit estimates for two reasons. First, in
our setting, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
across different artists is farmore important than addressing
the issue of innocent normalization to retrieve unbiased es-
timates of the proposed effects. Second, in an analysis using
heterogeneous choice models (not reported here, available
from the authors upon request), we find that the effects we
predict receive consistent statistical support. Hence, the
potential problem of innocent normalization does not ap-
pear to present a serious issue for our analysis.
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the likelihood of having an exhibition at galleries in
a given year.
Model 1 inTable 2A is thebaselinemodel;Model 2
includes the key covariates of Magazine Cover and
Award Won. As predicted, Award Won shows
a positive and statistically significant (p, .01) effect
on exhibiting at museums. Specifically, winning an
award increases the odds of exhibiting at a museum
by approximately 170 times. The effect ofMagazine
Cover is also positive and statistically significant
(p, .001), but themagnitude is considerably smaller
than that of winning an award. Appearing on a mag-
azine cover increases the odds of exhibiting at a mu-
seum by approximately 6.7 times. Model 3 in
Table 2A includes the effects of the interactions be-
tween Award Won and Prior Exhibitions at High-
Status Museums and between Award Won and Prior
Exhibitions at Other Museums. To reduce potential
multicollinearity, we mean-centered each moderat-
ingvariable prior to creating the interaction variables
(all the presented results remain the same in terms of
their direction and statistical significance levels if
we do notmean-center themoderating variables). As
predicted, the results indicate that both interaction
variables have positive and statistically significant
effects that enhance the effects ofAwardWon, but by
different magnitudes. Model 4 in Table 2A includes
the interaction variable between Award Won and
Prior Exhibitions at Galleries, after mean-centering
the moderating variable. We find no statistically
significant effect of this interaction variable.
Table 2B serves as the counterpart to Table 2A and
presents the results for models predicting gallery
exhibitions. Model 5 is the baseline model; Model 6
tests for the effects of audience-specific reputations.
Appearance on aMagazine Cover has a positive and
significant effect (p , .001) on gallery exhibitions,
increasing the odds of having an exhibition in a given
year by approximately 4. In contrast, Award Won is
not statistically related to gallery exhibitions. Model
7 in Table 2B adds the effects of the interactions be-
tween Magazine Cover and Prior Exhibitions at
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Pair-wise Correlationsa
TABLE 1A
Sample Used in Estimating Museum Exhibitions (N 5 116,590)
Variables Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Museum 0.39 0.49 0 1
(2) Magazine Cover 0.003 0.06 0 1 0.03
(3) Award Won 0.0003 0.02 0 1 0.01 0.03
(4) Prior Exhibitions at High-Status
Museums
0.04 0.23 0 5 0.05 0.09 0.03
(5) Prior Exhibitions at Other Museums 2.11 2.79 0 65 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.15
(6) Prior Exhibitions at Galleries 1.68 2.13 0 34 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.24
(7) Artist Tenure 2.8 2.19 0 8 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.52 0.47
(8) Country Diversity—Galleries 0.97 0.85 0 12 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.87 0.39
(9) Country Diversity—Museums 1.25 1.33 0 25 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.22 0.88 0.16 0.45 0.11
TABLE 1B
Sample Used in Estimating Gallery Exhibitions (N 5 154,098)
Variables Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Gallery 0.35 0.48 0 1
(2) Magazine Cover 0.003 0.06 0 1 0.02
(3) Award Won 0.0004 0.02 0 1 0.01 0.04
(4) Prior Exhibitions at High-Status
Galleries
0.05 0.24 0 9 0.06 0.05 0.03
(5) Prior Exhibitions at Other Galleries 1.62 1.84 0 28 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.13
(6) Prior Exhibitions at Museums 1.89 3.35 0 93 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.12
(7) Artist Tenure 2.74 2.17 0 8 20.02 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.50 0.38
(8) Country Diversity—Galleries 0.94 0.81 0 12 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.22 0.85 0.12 0.40
(9) Country Diversity—Museums 1.09 1.53 0 30 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.92 0.31 0.05
a Descriptive statistics are based on untransformed values. Correlations greater than or equal to |.01| are significant at p , .05.
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High-Status Galleries and between Magazine Cover
and Prior Exhibitions at Other Galleries. We mean-
center the moderating variables before creating the
interaction variables. The effect of the interaction
variable between Magazine Cover and Prior Exhibi-
tions at High-Status Galleries is not statistically sig-
nificant; however, the interaction variable between
Magazine Cover and Prior Exhibitions at Other Gal-
leries shows a positive and statistically significant
(p, .05) effect. Although we do not find evidence to
suggest that affiliations with high-status galleries
enhance the effect of having a reputation for com-
mercial viability, affiliations with non-high-status
galleries do enhance the effect of such a reputation.
In Model 8 in Table 2B, we include the interaction
variable between Magazine Cover and Prior Exhibi-
tion at Museums, after mean-centering the moder-
ating variable, and find a weak negative effect.
Based on the fully specified models (i.e., Model 4
andModel 8), we test Hypothesis 1a, Hypothesis 1b,
and Hypothesis 2. After obtaining the corrected (co)
variances with SUEST, we use a Wald test to com-
pare the effect ofAwardWon onmuseum and gallery
exhibitions, based on mean values for the moderat-
ing variables. The resulting Wald statistic indicates
that the effect of Award Won on success with the
museum audience is significantly greater (x25 5.69,
p , .05) than its effect on success with the gallery
audience, which supports Hypothesis 1a. Similarly,
we use aWald test to compare the effect ofMagazine
Cover on gallery and museum exhibitions, using
mean values for the moderating variables. The test
statistic indicates that the effect ofMagazine Cover is
not significantly greater (x2 5 1.03, p 5 n.s.) for gal-
lery exhibitions than for museum exhibitions.
Hence, Hypothesis 1b is not supported. We discuss
this in detail in our limitations section.
Using a similar procedure, we test Hypothesis 2,
which concerns the differences between audiences
with respect to the contingent effects of audience-
specific reputation. In particular, we compare the
interaction effect between Award Won and Prior
Exhibitions at High-status Museums in Model 4 and
the interaction effect between Magazine Cover and
Prior Exhibitions atHigh-statusGalleries inModel 8.
The Wald test indicates that the difference between
the two interaction effects is significantly greater for
the museum audience than for the gallery audience
(x2 5 275.70, p , .001), which supports Hypothesis
2. The relative advantage that high-status affiliations
bring, with respect to enhancing the positive effect of
audience-specific reputations, is greater for an au-
diencewith high accountability than for an audience
with low accountability.
TABLE 2
Conditional Logit Estimates of Audience-Specific Reputations on Having an Exhibition
TABLE 2A
Conditional Logit Estimates of Reputation Effects on Having an Exhibition at Museums (N 5 116,590)a
Museum Museum Museum Museum
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Prior Exhibitions at High-status Museums 20.27* (0.12) 20.33** (0.12) 20.33** (0.12) 20.33** (0.12)
Prior Exhibitions at Other Museums 23.22*** (0.06) 23.23*** (0.06) 23.23*** (0.06) 23.23*** (0.06)
Prior Exhibitions at Galleries 1.15*** (0.06) 1.14*** (0.06) 1.15*** (0.06) 1.15*** (0.06)
Artist Tenure 0.68*** (0.04) 0.69*** (0.04) 0.69*** (0.04) 0.69*** (0.04)
Country Diversity—Galleries 20.57*** (0.07) 20.57*** (0.07) 20.57*** (0.07) 20.57*** (0.07)
Country Diversity—Museums 0.52*** (0.06) 0.51*** (0.06) 0.51*** (0.06) 0.51*** (0.06)
Magazine Cover 1.89*** (0.38) 1.88*** (0.39) 1.88*** (0.39)
Award Won 5.14** (1.83) 2.53** (0.93) 2.38* (0.98)
AwardWon * Prior Exhibitions at High-status
Museums
28.33*** (1.01) 29.28*** (1.88)
Award Won * Prior Exhibitions at Other
Museums
1.46** (0.51) 1.361 (0.75)
Award Won * Prior Exhibitions at Galleries 0.34 (0.78)
Observations 116590 116590 116590 116590
BIC 78550.71 78494.46 78512.61 78524.15
a Year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on artists.
1 p , .10
* p , .05
** p , .01
*** p , .001. Two-tailed tests.
124 FebruaryAcademy of Management Journal
To test Hypothesis 3, we re-estimated the condi-
tional logit models with different dependent vari-
ables (see Table 3). In Model 9, the dependent
variable captureswhether an artist had an exhibition
at a high-statusmuseum in a given year; inModel 10,
the dependent variable captures whether an artist
had an exhibition at a non-high-status museum in
a given year. With these dependent variables, we re-
estimate Model 4 in Model 9 and Model 10. The
result from Model 9 reveals that the interaction var-
iable between Award Won and Prior Exhibitions at
Galleries has a negative and statistically significant
effect (p , .001), which suggests that an artist’s in-
teraction with a different audience (i.e., galleries)
reduces the effect of audience-specific reputation on
exhibiting at high-status museums. In Model 10,
which predicts exhibitions at non-high-status mu-
seums, the effect of the interaction variable is not
statistically significant, suggesting that while high-
status museums discount audience-specific reputa-
tions when artists interact with other audiences (as
above), non-high-status museums might not do so.
Similarly, we use separate dependent variables that
consider whether an artist has had an exhibition at
a high-status gallery or at a non-high-status gallery in
Models 11 and 12, respectively. Both models are
based on Model 8. In both Models 11 and 12, the es-
timates of the interaction variable betweenMagazine
Cover and Prior Exhibitions atMuseums are negative,
but thevariable isonlymarginallysignificant (p, .10)
inModel12,whichsuggests that anartist’s interaction
with the museum audience has a barely statistically
detectable influence on thevalue of audience-specific
reputation for success with galleries (either high- or
non-high-status).
Following the same procedure used to test Hy-
pothesis 1a, Hypothesis 1b, and Hypothesis 2, to
formally test Hypothesis 3 we first use seemingly
unrelated estimations to obtain corrected (co)vari-
ances, using Models 9 and 11. Then, we perform
a Wald test to compare the interaction between
Award Won and Prior Exhibitions at Galleries with
the interaction between Magazine Cover and Prior
Exhibitions at Museums. This test reveals that the
negative effect of the first interaction variable is sig-
nificantly greater than the negative effect of the sec-
ond interaction (x25 6.89, p, .01), which supports
Hypothesis 3. This suggests that the decline in the
effect of an audience-specific reputation due to
interacting with a different audience is significantly
greater for exhibiting at high-status museums than
for exhibiting at high-status galleries. Because high-
status members of the museum audience are partic-
ularly concerned with artistic quality, an artist’s
interaction with a gallery audience reduces the
value of the artist’s reputation for artistic quality. In
TABLE 2B
Conditional Logit Estimates of Reputation Effects on Having an Exhibition at Galleries (N 5 154,098)b
Gallery Gallery Gallery Gallery
Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Artist Tenure 0.68*** (0.04) 0.69*** (0.04) 0.69*** (0.04) 0.69*** (0.04)
Country Diversity—Galleries 1.60*** (0.06) 1.60*** (0.06) 1.60*** (0.06) 1.60*** (0.06)
Country Diversity—Museums 20.90*** (0.07) 20.91*** (0.07) 20.91*** (0.07) 20.91*** (0.07)
Prior Exhibitions at High-status Galleries 20.64*** (0.18) 20.66*** (0.18) 20.66*** (0.18) 20.66*** (0.18)
Prior Exhibitions at Other Galleries 24.69*** (0.07) 24.69*** (0.07) 24.70*** (0.07) 24.70*** (0.07)
Prior Exhibitions at Museums 1.81*** (0.06) 1.81*** (0.06) 1.81*** (0.06) 1.81*** (0.06)
Award Won 0.33 (0.65) 0.29 (0.62) 0.34 (0.63)
Magazine Cover 1.37*** (0.29) 0.741 (0.38) 1.26** (0.49)
Magazine Cover * Prior Exhibitions at
High-status Galleries
20.54 (0.54) 20.37 (0.53)
Magazine Cover * Prior Exhibitions at
Other Galleries
0.77* (0.35) 1.21** (0.41)
Magazine Cover * Prior Exhibitions at
Museums
20.541 (0.28)
Observations 154098 154098 154098 154098
BIC 95981.88 95965.09 95979.29 95985.31
b Year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on artists.
1 p , .10
* p , .05
** p , .01
*** p , .001. Two-tailed tests.
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contrast, because high-status members of the gallery
audience face less accountability compared to those
of high-status museums, high-status galleries’ as-
sessment of the value of an artist’s reputation for
commercial viability is not reduced by the artist’s
interaction with a museum audience.
Figure1depicts the contingent effects of status and
inter-audience interaction on the effect of Award
Won. For ease of presentation, the vertical axis is in
log-scale. In addition, only the significant in-
teractions are plotted in this figure, which are the
moderating effects for getting a museum exhibition,
but not those for getting an exhibition at a gallery,
because in the latter case the interaction effects are
not significant. As shown in the bars on the left side,
the effect of Award Won on having a museum exhi-
bition is significantly reduced when the artist does
not have any prior exhibitions at high-status mu-
seums, relative to the casewhen an artist’s number of
prior exhibitions at high-status museums is one
standard deviation above the mean. Thus, an artist’s
status positively moderates the effect of their repu-
tation on securing exhibitions at museums. In con-
trast, the bars on the right side of Figure 1 show that
the effect of Award Won on securing exhibitions at
museums is significantly reduced by inter-audience
interaction (i.e., by the artist’s exhibitions at galler-
ies). The effect of Award Won is significantly re-
duced when an artist has had more exhibitions at
galleries. This suggests a negative moderating effect
of inter-audience interaction on the relationship be-
tween the reputation of an artist and their success in
having exhibitions at museums (i.e., an audience
with high accountability).
Overall, the results provide consistent and statisti-
cally significant support for three out of four of our
hypotheses.Taken together, these resultsdemonstrate
the added value of considering audience-specific
reputations, especially the systematic differences in
the contingent effects of these reputations across dif-
ferent audiences, based on artists’ status and on their
interaction with other (i.e., non-focal) audiences.
TABLE 3
Conditional Logit Estimates on Subsamples of High-status versus Non-high-status Organizationsa
High-status Museum Other Museum High-status Gallery Other Gallery
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Artist Tenure 0.54* (0.22) 0.75*** (0.04) 0.62*** (0.18) 0.73*** (0.04)
Country Diversity—Galleries 20.39 (0.28) 20.58*** (0.07) 1.52*** (0.20) 1.75*** (0.06)
Country Diversity—Museums 0.93*** (0.26) 0.59*** (0.06) 20.35 (0.22) 20.91*** (0.07)
Magazine Cover 2.19*** (0.48) 1.64*** (0.37) 1.06 (0.99) 1.19* (0.47)
Award Won 3.161 (1.63) 2.35* (0.97) 1.18 (1.32) 0.39 (0.68)
Prior Exhibitions at High-status Museums 26.92*** (0.27) 1.02*** (0.12)
Prior Exhibitions at Other Museums 0.68** (0.22) 23.39*** (0.06)
Prior Exhibitions at Galleries 1.06*** (0.24) 1.14*** (0.06)
Award Won * Prior Exhibitions at
High-status Museums
0.22 (1.07) 27.35*** (1.16)
Award Won * Prior Exhibitions at
Other Museums
1.35 (1.12) 1.431 (0.74)
Award Won * Prior Exhibitions at Galleries 22.65*** (0.76) 0.34 (0.78)
Prior Exhibitions at High-status Galleries 24.78*** (0.24) 1.27*** (0.15)
Prior Exhibitions at Other Galleries 20.73*** (0.14) 24.89*** (0.07)
Prior Exhibitions at Museums 1.23*** (0.18) 1.77*** (0.06)
Magazine Cover * Prior Exhibitions at
High-status Galleries
1.081 (0.58) 21.83*** (0.52)
Magazine Cover * Prior Exhibitions at
Other Galleries
0.33 (0.55) 1.12* (0.44)
Magazine Cover * Prior Exhibitions at
Museums
20.39 (0.38) 20.491 (0.29)
Observations 10535 115982 10386 152903
BIC 4228.60 77554.84 5843.27 94561.40
a Year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on artists.
1 p , .10
* p , .05
** p , .01
*** p , .001. Two-tailed tests.
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Additional Analyses9
First, we investigate the possible implications of
non-repeated exhibitions (exhibitions at venues
where the artist has not exhibited before). Because it
is possible that audience-specific reputations in-
crease the likelihood of repeated exhibitions and not
the likelihood of non-repeated exhibitions, it is
worthwhile to examine the extent to which reputa-
tion effects are relevant for opportunities in new
venues.
To investigate this possibility, we reconstruct our
dependent variables to incorporate information on
non-repeated exhibitions. Specifically, these new
dependent variables are indicator variables that
capture whether, in a particular year, an artist has an
exhibition at a museum or at gallery at which they
have not previously exhibited. The results using
these new dependent variables are similar to those
reported in Table 2A and Table 2B. Specifically,
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2 continue to be sta-
tistically supported (forHypothesis 1a,x258.52,p,
.01 and for Hypothesis 2, x2 5 322.89, p , .001),
while Hypothesis 1b does not receive statistical
support (as in our main results). Using the new def-
inition of getting exhibitions at high-status organi-
zationswhere the artist has not previously exhibited,
Hypothesis 3 also continues to receive statistical
support (x2 5 15.03, p , .001). These results reveal
that themain effects of audience-specific reputations
with respect to different audiences—and the con-
tingency of these reputation effects (depending on an
artist’s status or interaction with another audience)
based on the accountability of audiences—are also
observed when success is defined as procuring ex-
hibitions at new (previously un-exhibited) venues
within each audience (rather than securing an exhi-
bition at any venue within an audience, as in our
main analysis).
Second, we have implicitly assumed an artist’s
status to be audience-specific in ourmain analysis by
considering high-status affiliations within the focal
audience only. Yet, one might suggest that an actor’s
status could also be inferred from their affiliations
with any high-status organization in a given field. If
we measure an artist’s status not by their previous
exhibitions at high-status organizations within the
focal audience but instead by previous exhibitions at
all high-status organizations (whether these organi-
zations are in the focal audience or in the other au-
dience), we continue to find statistical support for
the differential contingency effect of reputation
based on this measure of status, as we predict in
Hypothesis 2.
DISCUSSION
Reputation has generally been considered an
actor-level construct. However, recent contributions
have suggested reconsidering this assumption in fa-
vor of viewing reputation as a multi-dimensional
construct (Jensen et al., 2012; Lange et al., 2011). We
contribute to this discussion by proposing that
a reputation for particular attributes is valued by an
audiencewith concerns that focus on these attributes
more than by a different audiencewith concerns that
are not addressed by those attributes. Our examina-
tion of artists’ success with two distinct audiences,
museums and galleries, suggests that reputation ef-
fects are audience-specific. A reputation for artistic
quality, captured by winning a prestigious award,
has a stronger effect on an artist’s success with
a museum audience than with a gallery audience
(Hypothesis 1a). While we find evidence that a rep-
utation for commercial viability enhances an artist’s
success in both museums and galleries, we do not
FIGURE 1
Contingent Effect ofAwardWononHavingMuseum
and Gallery Exhibitionsa
1000
100
10
1
High-status
Museums
Galleries
High
Low
M
u
lt
ip
li
er
 (
in
 l
og
-s
ca
le
)
a The bars on the left show the effects of AwardWon on getting
an exhibition at museums, contingent upon two different levels of
Prior Exhibitions at High-status Museums. Because the distribu-
tion of Prior Exhibitions at High-status Museums is skewed,
“High” refers to11SD above themean level ofPrior Exhibitions at
High-status Museums, while “Low” refers to when the level of
Prior Exhibitions at High-status Museums is at its minimum. The
bars on the right show the effects of Award Won on getting an
exhibition at museums, contingent upon two different levels of
Prior Exhibitions at Galleries. “High” refers to 11 SD above its
mean level, while “Low” refers to 21 SD below its mean. The
vertical axis is in log-scale for ease of presentation.
9 The full results tables for all of the analyses reported
here are available from the authors upon request. They
have been omitted to save space.
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find a statistical difference between these two (Hy-
pothesis 1b). We discuss this in detail below.
Our study further documents the importance of
audience specificity by leveraging the level of ac-
countability an audience faces. Specifically, we
examine differences in the contingent effects of
reputation between museums (that face high ac-
countability from their diverse stakeholders) and
galleries (that face low accountability from their
stakeholders, who share similar objectives). Exam-
ining the audience-specific effect of reputations in
conjunction with two other signals, namely status
and interactions with other audiences, we find
strong support for our hypotheses. First, we find that
past exhibitions with high-status audience members
enhance the effect of audience-specific reputations
compared with exhibitions with non-high-status
audience members and, more important, that the
relative increase is greater for museums (which de-
pend on external sponsors for resources to a greater
extent and are thus more accountable) than for gal-
leries (Hypothesis 2). Second, we also find that the
greater interaction of an artist with a non-focal au-
dience reduces reputation effects on an artist’s
success with high-status museums more than with
high-status galleries (Hypothesis 3).
Theoretical Contributions
Thedifferentmain andcontingent effects of audience-
specific reputations that we find have several theo-
retical implications. First, studies that assume that
reputation is a single, aggregate, actor-level construct
might be misleading because they might systemati-
cally over- or under-state reputation effects, depend-
ing on the extent towhich audiences in a given setting
are similar to or different from one another. Hence,
our study argues for closely examining the attributes
captured by actors’ reputation measures and the ex-
tent to which these attributes are relevant for the
concerns and constraints of the audiences that rely on
these reputations.
Second, our study contributes to the growing body
of work investigating the relationship between rep-
utation and status. Studies have suggested that rep-
utation and status are useful at different stages
(Jensen & Roy, 2008) or for different purposes (Ertug
& Castellucci, 2013, 2015). These accounts imply
that the effects of reputation might be independent
of, and not contingent on, those of status. However,
more recent research has suggested that reputation
and status can enhance one another because together
they provide additional information that reduces
uncertainty (Stern et al., 2014). Our stance is that the
presence and degree of such interplay between rep-
utation and status is audience-specific. Our findings
in the field of contemporary art indicate that the ac-
countability of an audience enhances the contingent
effects of reputation on an artist’s success with this
audience, as based on their status. Therefore, our
study provides an important boundary condition
that needs to be attended to when studying the re-
lationship between reputation and status.
Third, our study also contributes to the growing
body of research on inter-audience spillover effects.
For example, Pollock et al. (2008) argued that there is
a positive information spillover between different
audiences when audiences follow one another to
gain information. Similarly, Jensen (2003) showed
that commercial banks leverage their status to engage
with a new audience in investment banking. In
contrast to these findings, however, the literature on
category and identity has suggested that actors span-
ning multiple categories generally suffer an evalua-
tiondiscount (Hsu,2006;Zuckermanetal., 2003).Our
findings suggest a boundary condition that might
reconcile these different views. The main effects of
exhibitions in a different (non-focal) audience—
although we did not explicitly hypothesize this—
suggest that artists with weaker reputations benefit
from greater interaction with other audiences (see
Tables 2A and 2B). We believe that this occurs be-
cause greater interaction with another audience pro-
vides elementary information that might reduce the
fundamental uncertainty, relevant for all audiences,
regarding the work of lesser-known artists. However,
we would not expect this to be true for more estab-
lished artists with stronger reputations. Indeed, we
find that greater interaction with a non-focal audience
diminishes the effects of reputation for artists with
stronger reputations. Furthermore, we find that this
discounting effect is stronger for the high-status
members of an audience with higher accountability
to others. These results indicate that the extent to
which an audience or its members are constrained
to justify their decisions constitutes an important
boundary condition for negative spillovers due to
cross-audience interaction. This is consistent with
Zuckerman et al.’s (2003: 1068) contention that
“typecasting processes operate more strongly in mar-
kets that are mediated by multiple layers of brokers,
eachofwhomacts to screenout candidateswhodonot
fit generic criteria.” When an audience’s evaluation
process is less constrained, we suspect that cross-
audience spillovers might exert positive or neutral ef-
fects on an actor’s success with the focal audience.
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Practical Implications
Our studyprovidespractical implications not only
for contemporary artists, but also those whose ca-
reers involve interacting with clients (or audiences
for their work) with diverse concerns and interests.
Even after achieving a positive reputation with
a particular group of clients, those in such careers
need tobe aware that this same reputationmaynot be
relevant for a different group of clients. Hence, such
people would need to manage their careers to focus
on one audience over others, depending on the at-
tributes forwhich their reputation(s) is (are) relevant.
This would also apply to, for example, managers
who work as brokers between external clients and
internal service providers (e.g., in an R&D de-
partment), whose key objectives and concerns differ.
Given that a good reputation among external clients
may not directly translate into an equally beneficial
reputation among internal service providers, these
managers should be aware of the differential effect of
reputation and might need to separately build a rel-
evant reputation for each audience group. Further-
more, as our arguments and findings regarding the
contingent effects suggest, to further enhance one’s
positive reputation (or to fully benefit from it) with
a given audience in a set, it would also be important
to consider the accountability of that audience. In the
example above, for instance, if the external client
(rather than the internal service providers) were
more accountable for their decisions vis-a`-vis the
output of the R&D department, the managers would
also need to be mindful that it would become even
more important to have other consistent signals of
the quality of their work in their dealings with these
external clients.
Limitations and Future Research
Our study is subject to certain limitations. First,we
find no statistical support for the differential effect of
appearing on a magazine cover on success with
museums and success with galleries (Hypothesis
1b). We believe that the lack of support is due to the
data available to measure a reputation for commer-
cial viability in this setting. Specifically, magazines
might also feature artists on their coverswho possess
artistic qualities in addition to their commercial vi-
ability. This is relevant because such occurrences
would add to measurement error, making our in-
dicator of a reputation for commercial viability
noisier than we would like (as it might also capture
some information about artistic quality). While this
is true for appearing on amagazine cover, the reverse
is not true for awards. Awards are commended and
defended as championing artistic quality, therefore
making our indicator of a reputation for artistic
quality more informative and less noisy. We suggest
that this is one reason that we find support for the
differential effect of winning an award (Hypothesis
1a) but not for the differential effect of appearing on
amagazine cover (Hypothesis 1b). The literature and
mechanisms we use for our framework, and the
consistent results we find for the differences in
contingent effects on status and interaction with
other audiences, suggest that the lack of support for
Hypothesis 1b is due to the noisymeasurement issue
noted above. In theory, one might improve on our
measure of magazine covers by using data on auc-
tions, for example, with the implication that artists
whose works have appeared in auctions more often,
orhave ahigher sales ratio (theproportionof lots sold
among those made available), have a reputation for
commercial viability. However, for the artists in our
estimation sample,wewere unable to find adatabase
that offers anywhere close to systematic and com-
prehensive coverage. We note this, again, to suggest
that, based on the support we have for the other
predictions and on the foundations of our frame-
work, we expect our predictions to be broadly ap-
plicable, despite the lack of support for Hypothesis
1b with the measure we use.
Second, we examine only two signals, among
possibly multiple types of other signals. Accord-
ingly, future research can consider signals or in-
tangible assets other than status or interaction with
other audiences (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Pollock&Gulati,
2007) and determine whether they, in conjunction
with reputation,would be informative for audiences,
and how this contingent relationship might again
vary on the basis of accountability or other broadly
applicable constructs that constrain the decision
making of audiences.
Third, the researchcontext of the contemporary art
field was used to develop our hypotheses and assess
audience-specific reputations. The unique charac-
teristics of this setting reduce the generalizability of
our findings, and future studies in other contexts are
needed to further establish the generalizability of the
framework underlying our hypotheses. However,we
view the contextual specificity of our study as
a strength rather than a weakness because the nu-
ances of audience-specific reputations require an in-
depth understanding of specific audiences and the
sources of their concerns and uncertainty in a par-
ticular setting. Our framework can be applied to
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different settings that have multiple audiences with
different concerns and uncertainties, such as aca-
demic researchers who combine teaching and re-
search (Fox, 1992), knowledge workers at high-tech
firms (such as scientists at biotechnology firms) who
collaborate with researchers at universities and re-
search institutions in addition to their colleagues at
private firms (Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Liebeskind,
Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996), and doctor–managers
whose positions combine a focus on occupation-
specific (medicine) and organization-specific (hospi-
taladministrationandmanagement)concerns (Iedema,
Degeling, Braithwaite, & White, 2004).
Fourth, we focus on emerging artists to avoid
research design and analysis problems regarding
left-censoring. However, focusing on emerging
artists also has implications regarding the bound-
ary conditions of our theory. Specifically, emerging
artists are relatively unknown, compared to estab-
lished artists; therefore, these emerging artists are
likely to benefit more from acquiring a positive
reputation. Our data availability do not allow us to
explore the extent to which reputation effects may
have greater impact on the success of emerging
artists. Nevertheless, we suggest that future work
can delve into this issue by specifically examining
differences in the magnitude of these effects, as has
been done for endorsements (e.g., Stuart, Hoang, &
Hybels, 1999).
Finally, some of the relationships we propose
might not apply to settings exhibiting clear audience
hierarchies (in which a number of different audi-
ences attend to a particular audience and adopt the
evaluations or recommendations of latter), or to set-
tings with no clear hierarchy but with “different”
audiences that attend to similar or identical attri-
butes that face highly similar types of uncertainty
(i.e., audiences that are nominally “different” in
certain respects but that do not actually differ re-
garding audience-specific reputations).
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